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Abstract.  This paper describes recent attempts to understand the evolution of
language in humans and argues that useful lessons can be learned from this
analysis by designers of hybrid symbolic/connectionist systems.
Introduction
If one doesn’t subscribe to the theory of the serendipitous emergence of language in
our ancestors several hundred thousand years ago, one is faced with a conundrum.
If language has been the product of evolution, what were its intermediate stages,
what foundation was it constructed upon?  This problem has recently been
thoroughly analysed by Terrence Deacon (1997) in his book “The Symbolic
Species”.  Deacon argues for the existence of an evolutionary path in the
development of the relationship between sign and signified that proceeds from an
iconic relationship, through a process of temporal and spatial indexicalisation (i.e.,
association), to an arbitrary and culturally licensed symbolic one.
The implications that this perspective has for hybrid symbolic/connectionist
system will be explored here.
An Evolutionary Perspective
Similarly to C.S. Pierce, Deacon distinguishes between three categories of sign:
iconic, indexical, and symbolic.  Iconic signs have some physical similarity with
what they signify, indexical signs are related to their referent either spatially or
temporally, and symbolic signs have an arbitrary relationship with their referent.  In
keeping with an evolutionary perspective, Deacon makes the case that symbol
systems emerged in human species through a process that moved from iconic
through indexical to symbolic sign usage.  Each succeeding level of sign usage
subsumed the preceding one.  Thus indexical signs are built upon spatio-temporal
relationships between icons, and symbols are constructed upon relationship between
indices and most importantly on relationship between other symbols.  So for
example, a child learning to read, first encounters printed words as iconic of print in
general, much in the same way as someone who doesn’t read Chinese might look
upon a book of Chinese characters.  Each character is equally iconic (trivially) of
written language.  As the child learns the writing system she proceeds to a stage
where the written signs index the spoken language and her perceptual environment
in a systematic way.  Finally, the relationships among these indices allow her to
access the symbolic aspects of the words.  However, the written words acquire their
symbolic status not simply by standing for something, but from the mesh of inter-
symbolic relationships in which they are embedded.
One of Deacon’s central points is that there is an isomorphism between the stages
leading to symbol development and the transition from perception (of icons),
through associationistic learning (of indices), through cognising (of symbols).  Only
humans have reached the final stage, though Deacon argues that the bonobo
chimpanzee, Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin, 1994), has attained a level of
sophistication in the symbolic domain that poses a major challenge to language
nativists.  Overall, Deacon’s thesis is an alternative to the nativists’ arguments
(Chomsky, 1986; Pinker, 1994) for the origins of language.  According to Deacon,
symbolic cognition, of which language is just one manifestation, emerged as a
function of an evolutionary dynamic between the selectional advantages provided by
simple symbol usage and pre-frontal cortical changes that favoured and supported
symbol usage.
Deacon supports his case by looking at the comparative neural anatomy of apes
and humans.  He demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, brain size is
not the key inter-species difference.  Rather it is the disproportional growth of the
pre-frontal cortex relative to other cortical areas.  The influence that this area has
over the rest of the cortex, as indicated by the cortico-cortical projections emanating
from, and projecting to, the region suggests that it plays a significant role in the
acquisition of symbolic behaviour.  An example of the role of the pre-frontal cortex
in a natural primate environment would be its use in foraging behaviour.  In
foraging, an effective strategy is not to return to the locations that one has most
recently visited, since they are least likely to provide a food reward.  Thus, one
needs to be able to suppress the more basic drive to return to where one has
previously had one’s behaviour reinforced.
In humans the pre-frontal enlargement dominates cortical function, and biases us
to a specific style of learning.  This involves, among other things, the ability to
detach from the immediate perceptual demands of a task, to switch between
alternative courses of action, to delay an immediate response to a stimulus, to tune
into higher-order features of the stimulus environment, and so on.  All of these
capabilities are essential pre-requisites for a facility with symbols.
A Maturational Wave
One of the paradoxes of artificial neural network research is that the capabilities of
artificial neural networks fall far short of those of the real thing, yet the learning
algorithm(s) employed by real neural networks may well be considerably simpler
and less powerful than, say, error backpropagation (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams,
1986).  The evidence to date suggests that some variant of Hebb’s rule, possibly
mediated by NMDA-based long term potentiation, may be the dominant learning
rule in natural nervous systems (Cruikshank & Weinberger, 1996).  The problem is
that Hebb’s rule cannot be used to learn even a trivial higher order function such as
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XOR, at least not directly.  So this presents the evolutionary account of the
emergence of symbolisation with a problem.  If the symbolic system is indeed built
upon layers of indexical and iconic relationships, we don’t have, prima facie, a
biological learning algorithm that is up to the job of acquiring the type of second-
order features of the environment necessary for symbol use.  Not only do we have an
impoverishment of stimulus if the nativist position is to be believed, we also appear
to have an impoverishment of learning mechanism.
However, Shrager and Johnson (1996) in an elegant computational study
demonstrated that the inclusion of a wave of learning plasticity passing through a
model cortex permitted the acquisition of higher-order functions using simple
Hebbian learning.  There is good evidence that just such a modulation of plasticity
occurs during cortical development (Thatcher, 1992).  An important feature is that it
affects the sensory-motor regions of the cortex initially and then moves through to
regions more distal from sensory-motor areas.  Elman and Rebotier (1997) argued
that this may have implications for language learning, in that it demonstrated an
interaction between developing cognitive capacity and the acquisition of rule-like
behaviour of increasing complexity.  In an earlier study, Elman (1993) had shown
that while a simple recurrent network (SRN) could not learn a complex context-free
grammar without an initial limitation in its memory capacity, which was gradually
enhanced.  This gradual increase in memory capacity was analogous to that found in
developing children.
There seems to me to be a useful connection to be made between Deacon’s
argument for the evolution and emergence of symbolic behaviour and Shrager et
al.’s discovery of relationship between developmental plasticity and the acquisition
of higher-order functions.  On the one hand Deacon proposes that the emergence of
language coincides with the ability to abstract higher-order features of the
environment mediated by an expansion of the pre-frontal cortex, while on the other
hand Shrager et al. demonstrate with their computational model that a wave of
learning plasticity travelling from primary sensory-motor areas to more distal
regions can permit the development of higher-order functions using just Hebbian
learning.  The connection between these two observations is that the pre-frontal
cortex is one of the later regions to experience the wave of plasticity, and is
therefore implicated in the development of higher-order functions.  It is quite likely,
therefore, that these higher-order functions are the very ones that are significant in
the development of linguistic and general symbolic capabilities of humans.
Symbol Emergence
Deacon identifies the case of Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994) as
suggestive of how symbol use might have got started in an early hominid species
such as Australopithecus.  Kanzi acquired the ability to use an artificial language
involving a board of lexigrams while being cared for by his mother.  One of the
more interesting features of this case is that Kanzi was not explicitly taught how to
use the lexigrams himself, but acquired his ability incidentally while his mother was
going through a training regime that ultimately proved ineffective for her.  This
appears to be analogous to the phenomenon described by Elman (1993), where a
complex grammar could only be acquired by a connectionist network  by “filtering”
it through an initially limited memory capacity, akin to the capacity limitations we
find with children.  What is important from an evolutionary point of view, however,
is not the means by which Kanzi acquired a significant facility with symbols, but
that he was able to do so at all.  This suggests that somewhere back in hominid
evolution conditions prevailed that facilitated and favoured the expression of an
incipient symbol ability.  This then set in train a process of dynamical co-evolution
between brain structure and cognitive abilities that led to the emergence of the
complex cognitive and linguistic skills that we manifest as a species.
The evolutionary jump to symbolisation from an association-based indexical
system, argued for by Deacon, requires an ability to discern certain key relationships
between symbols.  Although not referred to by Deacon (1997) explicitly as such,
these relationships are primarily those of compositionality and systematicity.  These
are the very features identified by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) as noticeably absent
from connectionist approaches to language and cognition.  While the
compostionality criticism has been positively addressed to most people’s satisfaction
by Van Gelder (1990), systematicity still remains a keenly debated issue (Hadley,
1994).  In the case of connectionist NLP models, it boils down to their ability (or
lack of it) to generalise their behaviour to new words in new positions in test
sentences.  Notwithstanding some positive indications (Christiansen & Chater,
1994), current connectionist models do not as yet demonstrate the strong
systematicity characteristic of a human language user.  Something is missing from
these connectionist accounts, and a clue to what this might be can be had by
exploring the role of the prefrontal cortex in human language use.
Signposts to a Connectionist/Symbolic Bridge
So what are the signposts referred to in the title of this paper?  While I cannot
suggest an immediate solution to the problem of figuring out how best to integrate
symbolic and connectionist modes of computation, I do believe that an analysis of
developments in language evolution provides useful indicators of where we should
look for promising approaches.  Some of the indications are that:
(1) we should build complex hybrid systems from simpler connectionist ones
using a maturational dynamic;
(2) we should explore the use of simple learning rules, such as Hebbian
learning, in conjunction with maturation;
(3) we should focus on finding ways to resolve the limitations in systematicity
of connectionist models;
I believe that the evidence adduced by Deacon indicates that while symbolisation is
constructed upon an iconic and associationistic foundation, its emergence has
required the addition of a qualitatively different cognitive mechanism.  In light of
this, the view that symbolisation is an emergent (or even epi-) phenomenon from a
non-symbolic substrate is untenable.  On the other hand, the additional mechanism is
not a language-specific alteration to the cognitive architecture, but a generic
modification that cuts across all aspects of cognitive function.  Explorations in the
space of hybrid symbolic/connectionist models that are constrained by these
assumptions will, I believe, yield fruitful results.
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